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Abstract—Authentication of smartphone users is important
because a lot of sensitive data is stored in the smartphone and
the smartphone is also used to access various cloud data and
services. However, smartphones are easily stolen or co-opted by
an attacker. Beyond the initial login, it is highly desirable to
re-authenticate end-users who are continuing to access security-
critical services and data. Hence, this paper proposes a novel
authentication system for implicit, continuous authentication of
the smartphone user based on behavioral characteristics, by
leveraging the sensors already ubiquitously built into smart-
phones. We propose novel context-based authentication models
to differentiate the legitimate smartphone owner versus other
users. We systematically show how to achieve high authentication
accuracy with different design alternatives in sensor and feature
selection, machine learning techniques, context detection and
multiple devices. Our system can achieve excellent authentica-
tion performance with 98.1% accuracy with negligible system
overhead and less than 2.4% battery consumption.
I. INTRODUCTION
Increasing amounts of private and sensitive information are
stored in our smartphones. 92.8% of Android smartphone
users store private information in their smartphones [1], [2].
Smartphones have also become personal computing platforms
for users to access cloud services, e.g., e-banking and online
social networks. Hence, smartphones are very attractive targets
for attackers to get access to personal and valuable informa-
tion. User authentication is essential to prevent the privacy,
confidentiality and integrity breaches possible through attacks
on the smartphone.
Current login mechanisms use explicit authentication, which
requires the user’s participation, e.g., passwords and finger-
prints. Iris scanning [3] and facial recognition [4], [5] can also
be used for explicit authentication. However, re-authentication
to access very sensitive information via explicit authentication
mechanisms is not convenient [6] for smartphone users. Hence,
after the user passes the initial authentication, the system does
not authenticate the user again. This creates a significant risk
for adversaries to take control of the users’ smartphones, after
the legitimate users’ initial login. This enables the adversaries
to access proprietary or sensitive data and services, whether
stored in the cloud or in the mobile device itself.
To protect smartphone data and cloud-based services from
adversaries who masquerade as legitimate users, we propose
a secure re-authentication system, which is both implicit and
continuous. An implicit authentication method does not rely on
the direct involvement of the user, but is closely related to her
behavior recorded by the smartphone’s built-in hardware, e.g.,
sensors, GPS and touchscreen. An implicitly continuous re-
authentication method should keep authenticating the user, in
addition to the initial login authentication, without interrupting
users. This can detect an adversary once he gets control of the
smartphone and can prevent him from accessing sensitive data
or services via smartphones, or inside smartphones.
Our system, called SmarterYou, exploits one of the most
important differences between personal computers and smart-
phones: a variety of sensors built into the smartphone, such
as the accelerometer and gyroscope. SmarterYou also exploits
the increasing number of wearable devices with Bluetooth
connectivity and multiple sensors, e.g., smartwatches.
SmarterYou has the following advantages compared with
previous smartphone authentication methods: (1) Instead of
the explicit one-time authentication on log-in, e.g., us-
ing passwords, fingerprints or touchscreen patterns [7], [8],
SmarterYou enables implicit, continuous authentication as a
background service, when the users use smartphones. This
can also be used in addition to the explicit authentication
methods. (2) We do not require user’s permissions. Many
past approaches require the user’s permission to get access
to the hardware in the smartphone, e.g., GPS [9] and mi-
crophone [10]. Access to these hardware require permission
because they contain private information of the user. (e.g.,
her location and phone conversations). (3) Some past work
had high authentication errors [11], [12]. Our approach can
have accuracy up to 98.1%. (4) Many approaches utilize
the touchscreen to analyze user’s writing or sliding patterns.
However, the touchscreen information may leak out sensitive
information, e.g., passwords or PINs [13], [14]. (5) Many past
approaches only work under some specific context [15], [16],
[17], [12], [18]. In SmarterYou, we utilize multiple contexts
to improve authentication accuracy, and also design a context
detection method that is user-agnostic.
In this paper, we utilize context detection techniques and
multiple mobile devices to achieve accurate authentication
performance stealthily, efficiently, and continuously. Also, we
protect cloud-customers’ services and data from malicious
end-users using smartphone sensors. We also provide a sys-
tematic evaluation of the design alternatives for our system,
in terms of sensors, features, contexts, multiple devices and
machine learning algorithms. Our key contributions are:
• Design of an implicit authentication system, SmarterYou, by
combining a user’s information recorded in the smartphone
and wearable devices. Our system continuously monitors a
TABLE I
COMPARISON OF OUR METHOD WITH OTHER IMPLICIT AUTHENTICATION (IF THE INFORMATION IS GIVEN IN THE PAPER CITED, OTHERWISE IT IS SHOWN
AS N.A. (NOT AVAILABLE)) FOR AUTHENTICATION ACCURACY, FALSE ACCEPT RATE (FAR) AND FALSE REJECT RATE (FRR).
Modality Performance # of Users
Accuracy FAR FRR
[17] Trojahn et al. 2013 Touchscreen n.a. 11% 16% 18
[19] Frank et al. 2013 Touchscreen 96% n.a. n.a. 41
[20] Li et al. 2013 Touchscreen 95.7% n.a. n.a. 75
[21] Feng et al. 2012 Touchscreen & accelerometer & gyroscope n.a. 4.66% 0.13% 40
[22] Xu et al. 2014 Touchscreen > 90% n.a. n.a. 31
[23] Zheng et al. 2014 Touchscreen & accelerometer 96.35% n.a n.a. 80
[15] Conti et al. 2011 accelerometer & orientation n.a. 4.44% 9.33% 10
[24] Kayacik et al. 2014 accelerometer & orientation & magnetometer & light n.a. n.a. n.a. 4
[11] Zhu et al. 2013 accelerometer & orientation & magnetometer 75% n.a. n.a. 20
[16] Nickel et al. 2012 accelerometer n.a. 3.97% 22.22% 20
[25] Lee et al. 2015 accelerometer & orientation & magnetometer 90% n.a. n.a. 4
[26] Yang et al. 2015 accelerometer n.a. 15% 10% 200
[9] Buthpitiya et al. 2011 GPS 86.6% n.a. n.a. 30
SmarterYou (this paper) 2017 accelerometer & gyroscope 98.1% 2.8% 0.9% 35
user’s behavior and re-authenticates the user in an accurate,
efficient, and stealthy manner.
• Design of a user-agnostic context detection approach to
differentiate various usage contexts of the user. We deter-
mine the minimum number of contexts that give the best
improvement in authentication performance.
• Design and evaluation of alternatives for all aspects of an ef-
ficient authentication method based on sensor measurements
used as behavioral patterns. We consider the minimum
number of sensors for high authentication accuracy, the best
features in both time and frequency domains, the benefit
of using multiple devices with sensors, the advantages of
user context-specific authentication models, and alternative
machine learning algorithms. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first systematic evaluation of design alternatives
for sensor-based user authentication.
• SmarterYou also provides automatic and continuous re-
training if the user’s behavioral pattern changes over time.
We also evaluate the performance overhead and battery
consumption of the system. Our approach can achieve high
authentication accuracy up to 98.1% with negligible system
overhead and less than 2.4% battery consumption.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
Traditional authentication approaches are based on posses-
sion of secret information, such as passwords. Also, phys-
iological biometrics based approaches make use of distinct
personal features, such as fingerprint or iris patterns. Recently,
behavior-based authentication utilize the distinct behavior of
users.
There are many different physiological biometrics for au-
thentication, such as face patterns [5], fingerprints [27], and
iris patterns [3]. However, physiology-based authentication
requires user participation in the authentication. Thus, they are
more useful for initial login authentication instead of implicit
and continuous authentication and re-authentication.
Behavior based authentication assumes that people have
distinct, mostly stable, patterns for a certain behavior, such as
gesture pattern [17], gait [16] and GPS patterns [9]. Behavior-
based authentication exploits users’ behavioral patterns to
authenticate a user’s identity. Below we review past work in
this area and summarize them in Table I.
Touchscreen-based Smartphone Authentication.
Trojahn et al. [17] developed a mixture of a keystroke-based
and handwriting-based mechanisms to realize authentication
through the touchscreen sensor. Their approach has achieved
11% false accept rate (FAR) and 16% false reject rate (FRR).
Frank et al. [19] utilize 22 analytic features from sliding traces
to differentiate users. Their result can achieve 4% equal error
rate. Li et al. [20] exploited five basic movements (sliding
up, down, right, left and tapping) on the touchscreen and
their related combinations as the user’s behavioral pattern
features, to perform authentication. Their result shows that
sliding up can achieve the best accuracy of 95.7%. Feng et
al. [21] utilize touchscreen with sensor gloves to record the
fine-grained information of gestures. They can achieve up to
4.66% FAR and 0.13% FRR. Xu et al. [22] combine the
slide, keystroke, handwriting and pinch to authenticate the
user. Zheng et al. [23] combine the accelerometer with the
touchscreen to authenticate a user when the user is entering
her PIN.
Touchscreen-based authentication can achieve high accu-
racy. However, Serwadda et al. [28] showed that gesture styles
could be observed and replicated automatically. Also, the
touchscreen information contains sensitive information, e.g.,
the attacker may use the touchscreen information to find out
the user’s passwords [13].
Sensor-based Smartphone Authentication.
Conti et al. [15] proposed to authenticate a user using
the arm movement patterns, sensed by the accelerometer
and orientation sensor, while the user is making a phone
call. Their method achieved 4.4% FAR and 9.3% FRR.
Kayacik et al. [24] proposed a light-weight, and temporally
& spatially aware user behavioral model for user authenti-
cation based on both hard and soft sensors. However, they
did not quantitatively show their authentication performance.
SenSec [11] constantly collects data from the accelerometer,
gyroscope and magnetometer, to construct gesture models
while the user is using the device. SenSec has shown it can
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Fig. 1. SmarterYou architecture including the cloud-based training module and smartphone-based authentication module
achieve 75% accuracy in identifying owners. Nickel et al.
[16] proposed an accelerometer-based behavior recognition
method to authenticate a smartphone user through the k-
NN algorithm. They can achieve 3.97% FAR and 22.22%
FRR. Lee et al. [25] showed that using more sensors can
improve the authentication performance. They monitored the
users’ living patterns and utilized SVM as a classifier for user
authentication. Their result achieves 90% accuracy. Yang et al.
[26] propose a hand waving biometric-based authentication
method that utilise users’ waving patterns for locking and
unlocking the smartphone by using the accelerometer. They
can achieve 15% FAR and 10% FRR on average. In [9], a
geo-based authentication is proposed for modeling a user’s
mobility pattern. They use the GPS sensor to demonstrate
that the system could detect abnormal activities (e.g., a phone
being stolen) by analyzing a user’s location history, and they
can achieve 86.6% accuracy. However, the GPS information
is sensitive, thus its use requires explicit user permission.
Different from these past methods, our SmarterYou system
has broader contexts and the highest authentication accuracy
(98.1%), with low computational complexity.
Continuous and Context-based Authentication.
Riva et al. [10] built a prototype to use face recognition,
proximity, phone placement, and voice recognition to pro-
gressively authenticate a user. However, their objective is to
decide when to authenticate the user and is thus orthogonal to
our setting. Their prototype has a 42% reduction in requested
explicit authentication, but this was conducted with 9 users
only. Their scheme also requires access to sensors that need
users’ permissions, limiting their applicability for implicit,
continuous authentication proposed in our system.
Existing continuous authentication approaches [17], [16],
[15] focused on a specific usage context and would fail if
the attacker who steals the smartphone does not perform
under the specific usage context. In contrast, our system
can automatically detect a context in a user-agnostic manner
and can continuously authenticate a user based on various
authentication models. That is, our system can authenticate the
users without requiring any specific usage context, making it
more applicable in real world scenarios.
Authentication with Wearable Devices.
Recently, wearable devices have emerged in our daily lives.
However, limited research has been done on authenticating
users by these wearable devices. Mare et al. [29] proposed
ZEBRA which is a bilateral recurring authentication method.
The signals sent from a bracelet worn on the user’s wrist
are correlated with the terminal’s operations to confirm the
continued presence of the user if the two movements correlate
according to a few coarse-grained actions. To the best of our
knowledge, there is no smartphone authentication research
proposed in the literature that combines a wearable smartwatch
with a smartphone to authenticate a user, as we do.
III. THREAT MODEL AND ASSUMPTIONS
We consider an attacker who has physical access to a
smartphone. The smartphone may even have passed an initial
explicit login authentication, giving the attacker opportunity to
access secure or private information on the phone and in the
cloud using the phone. Confidentiality, integrity, authentication
and privacy breaches are considered.
Wearable devices are gaining popularity, e.g., smartwatches
and fitbits. They also contain many sensors e.g., accelerom-
eter, gyroscope, ambient light and heartbeat sensors, and can
communicate with smartphones via Bluetooth. We assume
each smartwatch (and smartphone) is associated with one
owner/user and that users do not share their smartwatches
(and smartphones). We assume the communication between
the smartwatch and smartphone is secure. We do not assume
that users always have their smartwatch with them, so authen-
tication based on smartphone alone is in scope.
While network access is required for authentication model
training, or retraining after behavioral drift, network access
is not required for user authentication (testing) when the
smartphone is being used.
IV. SYSTEM DESIGN
A. Architecture Overview
Figure 1 shows the proposed SmarterYou architecture. It
includes three hardware devices: the user-owned wearable de-
vice (e.g., smartwatch), the smartphone, and the authentication
server in the cloud.
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1) Wearable IoT device: In SmarterYou, we consider a two-
device authentication configuration, which includes a smart-
phone and a user-owned wearable device. We use a smartwatch
as an example, but other types of wearable devices, e.g.,
health sensors, can also be applied to SmarterYou. SmarterYou
is designed for implicit authentication on the smartphone,
where the smartwatch serves as important auxiliary informa-
tion for improving authentication accuracy. The smartwatch
keeps monitoring a user’s raw sensors’ data and sends the
information to the smartphone via Bluetooth. Our system
works if only the smartphone is present, but we will show
that it works even better if the smartwatch is also present.
2) Smartphone: Similar to the smartwatch, the smartphone
also monitors the user’s sensor data. It runs the authentication
testing module as a background service in the smartphone. In
the testing module, the feature extraction component receives
the sensor data from the smartphone and smartwatch. Then
it extracts fine-grained time-frequency features from the raw
data, and forms two feature vectors: the context feature vector
and the authentication feature vector, and feeds them into the
context detection component and the authentication compo-
nent, respectively. The context detection component decides
which context the user is in and sends the detected context to
the authentication component.
The authentication component consists of a classifier and
multiple authentication models. The classification algorithm
we selected is the kernel ridge regression (KRR) algorithm
[30], but other machine learning algorithms can also be used.
An authentication model is a file containing parameters for the
classification algorithm and determines the classifier’s func-
tionality. Using different authentication models for different
contexts, the classifier can authenticate the user based on the
authentication feature vector under different contexts. When a
detected context and an authentication feature vector is fed in,
the classifier chooses the corresponding authentication model
and makes a classification.
When the classifier in the authentication component gen-
erates the authentication results, it sends these results to the
Response Module. If the authentication results indicate the
user is legitimate, the Response Module will allow the user to
use the cloud apps to access the critical data or cloud services
in the app server. Otherwise, the Response Module can either
lock the smartphone or refuse accesses to security-critical data,
or perform further checking. Our system can be used with
existing explicit authentication methods, e.g., passwords or
fingerprints. If the attacker is locked out, the system requires
explicit authentication.
3) Authentication Server: SmarterYou includes a training
module, which is deployed in the Authentication Server in the
cloud, because it requires significant computation and must
consider the privacy of the training data set, which includes
data from other users. When a legitimate user first enrolls
in the system, she downloads the context detection model
from the Authentication Server and then the system keeps
collecting the legitimate user’s authentication feature vectors
and detected contexts for training the authentication models.
Our system deploys a trusted Authentication cloud server to
collect sensors’ data from all the participating legitimate users.
To protect a legitimate user’s privacy, the users’ data are
anonymized. In this way, a user’s training module can use
other users’ feature data but has no way to know the other
users’ identities. The training module uses the legitimate user’s
authentication feature vectors and other people’s authentication
feature vectors in the training algorithm to obtain the authen-
tication models based on different contexts. After training,
the authentication models are downloaded to the smartphone.
The training module does not participate in the authentication
testing process and is only needed for retraining when the
device recognizes a user’s behavioral drift, which is done
online and automatically. Therefore, our system does not pose
a high requirement on the communication delay between the
smartphone and the Authentication Server.
B. System Operation
SmarterYou is based on the observation that users’ behav-
ioral patterns are different from person to person, and vary
under different usage contexts, when they use smartphones and
smartwatches. Instead of authenticating the user with one uni-
fied model as in [15], [16], [17], [12], [18], [31], it is better to
explore different finer-grained models to authenticate the user
based on different usage contexts. For example, using a user’s
walking behavioral model to authenticate the same user who is
sitting while using the smartphone is obviously not accurate. In
Table VII, we show that considering contexts provides better
accuracy. To be applicable in real world scenarios, we assume
that the context information is user-agnostic: we can detect
the context of the current user prior to authenticating her (as
validated in Section V-E). Under each context, each user has
distinct behavioral characteristics. SmarterYou utilizes such
characteristics to implicitly authenticate the users. Our system
can be used with other context detection methods [32], [33].
Context detection is an interesting research area e.g., Chen et
al. [32] show that they can achieve up to 99% accuracy in
context detection. In this paper, we show that by considering
even simple contexts, we can improve the authentication
accuracy significantly. More contexts, appropriately chosen,
may further improve the authentication accuracy.
There are two phases for learning and classifying the
user’s behavioral pattern: enrollment phase and continuous
authentication phase.
Enrollment Phase: Initially, the system must be trained in
an enrollment phase. When users want to use the apps in
the smartphone to access sensitive data or cloud services,
the system starts to monitor the sensors and extract particular
features from the sensors’ data and label them with a context
based on the context detection approach in Section V-E. This
process continues and the data should be stored in a protected
buffer in the smartphone until the distribution of the collected
features converges to an equilibrium, which means the size of
data can provide enough information to build a user’s profile.
This is about 800 measurements for our method, as shown in
Section V-F3. At this time, one can assume that 1) the user got
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Fig. 2. Demographics of the participants
used to her device and her device-specific ‘sensor-behavior’
no longer changes, and 2) the system has observed sufficient
information to have a stable estimate of the true underlying
behavioral pattern of that user. The system can now train the
authentication classifiers under various contexts and switch to
the continuous authentication phase.
Continuous Authentication Phase: Once the authentication
classifiers are trained and sent to the smartphone, the smart-
phone can start the authentication phase. This is done only in
the smartphone, so network availability is not required. Based
on the sensor data, SmarterYou first decides which context
the user is in and then uses the authentication classifier for
the detected context. The authentication classifier then decides
whether these sensors’ data are coming from the legitimate
user. The authentication classifier can also be automatically
updated when the legitimate user’s behavioral pattern changes
with time.
Post-Authentication: If the authentication feature vector is
authenticated as coming from the legitimate user, this testing
passes and the user can keep accessing the sensitive data in
the smartphone or in the cloud via the smartphone. When
an attacker tries to access a smartphone of a legitimate
user, the system automatically de-authenticates him. Once
SmarterYou decides that the smartphone is now being used
by someone other than the legitimate user, the system can
perform defensive responses as described earlier. Similarly, if
the legitimate user is misclassified, several mechanisms for re-
instating her are possible, such as two-channel or multi-factor
authentication, or requiring an explicit login again, possibly
with a biometric, to unlock the system.
Retraining Models: The behavioral patterns of SmarterYou
users could be changed some time after the initial model train-
ing. So it is necessary to retrain users’ models to prevent false
alarms due to legitimate behavioral drift. SmarterYou provides
a model retraining mechanism, which can automatically and
continuously retrain the models based on the authentication
performance. We define a metric called Confidence Score
(CS) to measure if it is necessary to retrain the model. If so,
SmarterYou will again upload the legitimate user’s latest au-
thentication feature vectors to the cloud server, and update the
new models from the training module. It is important to note
that adversaries can also exploit this mechanism to retrain the
authentication models and achieve accesses to sensitive data
with the smartphone. We use multi-factor authentication to
prevent these potential vulnerabilities (details in Section V-I).
TABLE II
FISHER SCORES OF DIFFERENT SENSORS.
Smartphone Smartwatch
Acc(x) 3.13 3.62
Acc(y) 0.8 0.59
Acc(z) 0.38 0.89
Mag(x) 0.005 0.003
Mag(y) 0.001 0.0049
Mag(z) 0.0025 0.0002
Gyr(x) 0.57 0.24
Gyr(y) 1.12 1.09
Gyr(z) 4.074 0.59
Ori(x) 0.0049 0.0027
Ori(y) 0.002 0.0043
Ori(z) 0.0033 0.0001
Light 0.0091 0.0428
C. Security Protections
Protecting data in transit. Since sensitive data are being
transmitted between smartwatches, smartphones and cloud
servers, secure communications protocols must be used to
provide confidentiality and integrity protection against network
adversaries. For instance, an initialization key is exchanged
when the smartwatch is paired with the smartphone using
Bluetooth. New keys derived from this key can also be used
to encrypt and hash the raw data transmitting between smart-
watch and smartphone via Bluetooth. The communication
channels between smartphones and cloud servers are protected
by SSL/TLS protocols.
Protecting data at rest (i.e., in storage). For data stored
in the smartphones or cloud servers, cryptographic encryption
and hashing operations are used to prevent the attackers from
stealing or modifying data.
Protecting data and code at runtime. The smartphone and
Authentication Server must also provide a secure environment
for running the SmarterYou authentication System. Since most
smartphones use ARM processors, smartphones can exploit
the ARM TrustZone [34] feature to place the authentication
Testing Module in the Secure World and isolate it from other
apps in the Normal World. Since cloud servers tend to use Intel
processors, the trusted Authentication Server can set up secure
enclaves by using Intel Sofware Guard eXtensions (SGX)
[35] for the training and retraining modules for SmarterYou,
and for securely accessing and using sensitive behavioral
measurements from many smartphone users.
V. DESIGN ALTERNATIVES
Although we have outlined the basic architecture for our
system, there are many design parameters that have yet to be
chosen. Our goal is to get the highest authentication accuracy
using the most commonly available sensors and computation-
ally simple algorithms, to facilitate rapid deployment. What
sensors should we use? What features of the raw sensor
data streams are best? Can sensors from different devices
help improve accuracy? Can contexts improve authentication
accuracy, and if so, what are the simplest contexts that give
the best accuracy? Which machine learning algorithms are
best? Below, we systematically evaluate alternatives for each
of these design choices.
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TABLE III
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN EACH PAIR OF FEATURES. THE UPPER TRIANGLE IS THE CORRELATION BETWEEN FEATURES IN THE SMARTPHONE,WHILE
THE LOWER TRIANGLE IS THE CORRELATION BETWEEN FEATURES IN THE SMARTWATCH.
Accelerometer Gyroscope
Mean Var Max Min Ran Peak Peak f Peak2 Mean Var Max Min Ran Peak Peak f Peak2
A
cc
el
er
o
m
et
er
Mean 0.39 0.35 0.59 0.27 -0.12 -0.15 0.31 0.30 0.17 0.11 -0.26 0.13 0.27 0.04 0.34
Var 0.11 0.28 -0.26 0.90 0.35 0.30 0.41 0.12 -0.29 0.10 0.16 -0.33 0.25 0.20 0.18
Max 0.42 0.37 -0.22 0.78 0.35 0.23 0.43 0.07 0.32 0.39 0.16 0.19 0.25 0.29 0.23
Min 0.31 -0.23 -0.36 -0.34 -0.44 -0.43 0.14 0.18 -0.10 0.38 0.05 -0.32 0.32 0.15 0.05
Ran 0.43 0.94 0.59 0.22 0.28 0.47 0.37 0.22 0.11 0.35 0.21 0.12 0.18 -0.08 0.30
Peak -0.02 0.21 0.24 -0.33 -0.04 0.19 0.03 0.35 0.23 0.31 0.09 0.30 0.28 0.37 0.21
Peak f 0.28 -0.04 0.39 0.16 0.43 0.21 0.09 0.27 0.34 0.10 0.30 0.20 0.05 0.11 0.17
Peak2 -0.16 -0.08 0.33 0.44 0.17 0.26 -0.32 0.16 0.31 0.15 0.09 0.29 0.12 0.23 0.28
G
y
ro
sc
o
p
e
Mean 0.33 0.31 0.20 0.27 0.27 0.34 0.09 0.16 0.20 0.31 0.39 0.36 0.21 -0.06 -0.18
Var 0.18 0.35 0.18 0.05 0.35 0.05 0.19 0.12 0.31 -0.15 0.04 0.95 0.08 0.34 -0.51
Max 0.32 0.34 0.36 0.30 -0.17 0.33 0.22 0.17 -0.27 0.21 0.37 0.68 0.42 -0.27 0.38
Min 0.32 0.16 0.18 0.04 0.29 0.24 0.12 0.13 -0.14 0.47 0.37 0.34 0.18 0.15 -0.34
Ran 0.13 0.04 -0.19 0.11 0.29 0.09 -0.24 0.19 0.03 0.89 0.60 -0.14 -0.21 0.12 0.23
Peak 0.07 0.15 -0.33 0.18 0.35 0.06 0.33 0.30 0.25 -0.18 0.41 0.02 -0.38 0.33 0.16
Peak f 0.21 0.17 0.23 0.26 -0.13 0.13 0.36 0.16 0.32 0.36 -0.20 0.32 0.24 0.18 0.07
Peak2 0.33 0.07 0.30 0.16 0.32 0.21 0.35 0.15 -0.29 0.12 -0.10 0.39 0.34 0.12 -0.19
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Fig. 3. KS test on sensor features.
A. Experimental settings
We perform different types of experiments with 35 par-
ticipants, using Nexus 5 smartphones and Moto 360 smart-
watches. We recorded the demographics (gender, and age
range) of the participants and show them in Figure 2. We
collected sensor data from different sensors in the smartphone
and the smartwatch, with a sampling rate of 50 Hz. The differ-
ent types of experiments (free-form usage, lab experiments and
attacker usage) will be discussed in detail in the sub-sections
they are used, as we attempt to answer the above questions on
the design parameters of our implicit authentication system.
All experimental results in the following sub-sections are
based on the free-form use of the smartphone and smartwatch
for two weeks, except the experiments for context detection
(where lab conditions are used) and the masquerading attacks
(where attacker usage is imitated). Free-form usage means the
users can use the devices with no restrictions, as they normally
would in their daily lives.
In our collected data for the machine learning algorithms,
we used 10-fold cross-validation to generate the training
data and testing data sets for evaluating the authentication
performance, i.e., 9/10 data would be used as the training
data and the remaining 1/10 is used as the testing data. To
extensively investigate the performance of our system, we
repeated such cross-validating mechanisms for 1000 iterations
and averaged the experimental results.
We also discuss the complexity of our system and the impact
on the battery drainage (Section V-H). Finally, we discuss
re-training authentication models (Section V-I) due to users’
behavioral drift.
B. Which sensors to use?
Mobile sensing technology has matured to a state where
collecting many measurements through sensors in smartphones
is now becoming quite easy through, for example, Android
sensor APIs. Mobile sensing applications, such as the CMU
MobiSens[36], run as a service in the background and can con-
stantly collect sensors’ information from smartphones. Sensors
can be either hard sensors (e.g., accelerometers) that are
physically-sensing devices, or soft sensors that record infor-
mation of a phone’s running status (e.g., screen on/off). Thus,
practical sensors-based user authentication can be achieved
today. But which sensors should we select?
We use Fisher scores (FS)[37] to help select the most
promising sensors for user authentication. FS is one of the
most widely used supervised feature selection methods due to
its excellent performance. The Fisher Score enables finding a
subset of features, such that in the data space spanned by
the selected features, the distances between data points in
different classes are as large as possible, while the distances
between data points in the same class are as small as possible.
Table II shows the FS for different sensors that are widely
implemented in smartphones and smartwatches. We found that
the magnetometer, orientation sensor and light sensor have
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lower FS because they are influenced by the environment.
This can introduce various background noise unrelated to the
user’s behavioral characteristics, e.g., the magnetometer may
be influenced by magnets. Therefore, we select two sensors,
the accelerometer and gyroscope, because they have higher
FS and furthermore, are the most common sensors built into
current smartphones and smartwatches [38].
These two sensors also represent different information about
the user’s behavior: 1) the accelerometer records coarse-
grained motion patterns of a user, such as how she walks
[16]; and 2) the gyroscope records fine-grained motions of
a user such as how she holds a smartphone [13]. Furthermore,
these sensors do not need the user’s permissions, making
them useful for continuous background monitoring in implicit
authentication scenarios.
C. What sensor features are best?
Using the raw sensor data streams from the selected sensors
may not be as good as using statistical features derived from
these raw sensor data streams. Hence, we segment the sensor
data streams into a series of time windows, and compute
statistics from both the time domain and the frequency domain
for the sensor data values in a time window. The magnitude
of sensor i’s data stream in the k-th window is denoted
Si(k). For example, the magnitude of an accelerometer data
sample (t, x, y, z) is computed as m =
√
x2 + y2 + z2. We
implement the Discrete Fourier transform (DFT) [39] to obtain
the frequency domain information. The frequency domain
information is useful and is widely used in signal processing
and data analysis, e.g., speech signals and images.
We compute the following statistical features derived from
each of the raw sensor streams, in each time window:
• Mean: Average value of the sensor stream
• Var: Variance of the sensor stream
• Max: Maximum value of the sensor stream
• Min: Minimum value of the sensor stream
• Ran: Range of the sensor stream
• Peak: The amplitude of the main frequency of the sensor
stream
• Peak f: The main frequency of the sensor stream
• Peak2: The amplitude of the secondary frequency of the
sensor stream
• Peak2 f: The secondary frequency of the sensor stream
We then test the performance of each feature and drop
“bad” features. If a feature can be used to easily distinguish
two users, we say the feature is a good feature. For a
feature to distinguish two different persons, it is necessary
for the two underlying distributions to be different. Hence,
for each feature, we test whether this feature derived from
different users is from the same distribution. If most pairs of
them are from the same distribution, the feature is “bad” in
distinguishing two persons and we drop it.
We use the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (KS test) [40] to test
if two data sets are significantly different. The KS test is a
nonparametric statistical hypothesis test based on the maxi-
mum distance between the empirical cumulative distribution
functions of the two data sets. The two hypotheses of a KS
test are:
H0: the two data sets are from the same distribution
H1: the two data sets are from different distributions.
A KS test reports a p-value, i.e. the probability that obtain-
ing the maximum distance is at least as large as the observed
one when H0 is assumed to be true. i.e., H0 is accepted. If this
p-value is smaller than α, usually set to 0.05, we will reject the
H0 hypothesis because events with small probabilities rarely
happen (rejecting H0 and accepting H1 indicates a “good”
feature for distinguishing users). For each feature, we calculate
the p-value for data points for each pair of users and drop a
feature if most of its p-values are higher than α.
Figure 3 shows the testing results for the features in both
the smartphone and smartwatch. For each feature, the resulting
p-values are drawn in a box plot. The bottom and the top lines
of the box denote the lower quartile Q1 and upper quartile Q2,
defined as the 25th and the 75th percentiles of the p-values.
The middle bar denotes the median of the p-values. The y-axes
in Figure 3 is in logarithmic scale. The red horizontal lines
represent the significance level α = 0.05. The better a feature
is, the more of its box plot is below the red line. It denotes that
more pairs are significantly different. From Figure 3, we find
that the accPeak2 f and gyrPeak2 f in both the smartphone
and the smartwatch are “bad” features, so we drop them.
Next, we try to drop redundant features, by computing the
correlation between each pair of features. A strong correlation
between a pair of features indicates that they are similar in
describing a user’s behavior pattern, so one of the features
can be dropped. A weak correlation implies that the selected
features reflect different behaviors of the user, so both features
should be kept.
We calculated the Pearson’s correlation coefficient between
any pair of features. Then, for every pair of features, we took
the average of all resulting correlation coefficients over all
the users. Table III shows the resulting average correlation
coefficients. The upper right triangle is the correlation between
features in the smartphone, while the lower left triangle is the
correlation between features in the smartwatch. We observe
that Ran has very high correlation with Var in each sensor
on both the smartphone and smartwatch. It means that Ran
and Var have information redundancy. Also Ran has relatively
high correlation with Max. Therefore, we drop Ran from our
feature set.
D. Do multiple devices help?
We also study if using data from the same type of sensors
(accelerometer and gyroscope), but from different devices
is helpful for improving user authentication. Towards this
end, we calculate the correlations between smartphone and
smartwatch sensor data in Table IV. Since these features do
not have strong correlation with each other, it implies that these
same sensors on the two devices measure different aspects of
a user’s behavior, so we keep all these features.
Hence our feature vector for sensor i, in a given time
window k, for the smartphone, SP , is
7
TABLE IV
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN SMARTPHONE AND SMARTWATCH. ROW LABELS ARE THE FEATURES FROM SMARTWATCH AND COLUMN LABELS ARE THE
FEATURES FROM SMARTPHONE.
Smartphone Accelerometer Smartphone Gyroscope
Mean Var Max Min Peak Peak f Peak2 Mean Var Max Min Peak Peak f Peak2
S
m
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er
Mean 0.08 0.33 -0.23 0.20 0.26 0.10 0.42 0.27 -0.31 -0.10 0.03 0.13 -0.19 0.06
Var -0.29 0.23 0.09 -0.08 -0.21 0.27 -0.24 0.04 0.39 0.26 0.05 0.17 0.15 0.37
Max 0.35 -0.05 -0.02 -0.34 -0.15 -0.33 0.20 -0.25 0.24 0.09 0.26 -0.32 0.23 -0.22
Min -0.24 0.29 -0.34 0.21 -0.37 0.39 0.05 0.30 0.04 -0.33 -0.32 -0.15 -0.23 -0.13
Peak -0.08 -0.11 0.40 0.08 -0.07 -0.33 -0.35 -0.17 0.21 0.24 -0.29 0.08 -0.28 0.21
Peak f 0.11 -0.21 0.03 -0.10 0.33 0.07 0.34 -0.22 -0.18 0.04 0.32 -0.07 -0.12 -0.31
Peak2 -0.26 -0.16 -0.08 0.14 -0.32 -0.26 0.24 0.24 -0.24 0.41 0.15 -0.37 -0.12 -0.32
S
m
ar
tw
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e
Mean 0.02 0.13 -0.16 0.08 0.36 0.37 -0.26 -0.31 0.20 -0.31 0.33 0.37 -0.24 0.26
Var 0.16 0.29 -0.33 -0.26 0.03 -0.30 -0.10 -0.26 0.03 0.05 0.02 -0.29 0.27 0.21
Max -0.12 -0.30 0.22 0.21 -0.14 -0.20 -0.03 0.10 0.12 0.05 0.31 0.30 0.32 -0.28
Min 0.07 -0.22 -0.18 0.19 -0.29 0.30 0.11 0.15 0.06 0.29 -0.33 -0.11 -0.04 -0.13
Peak 0.28 -0.21 -0.27 0.34 0.37 0.16 0.23 0.29 0.20 0.04 0.14 0.19 -0.10 -0.05
Peak f -0.23 -0.06 -0.25 0.29 0.33 0.18 0.28 -0.16 0.25 -0.32 0.20 -0.04 -0.06 0.12
Peak2 0.13 -0.07 0.21 -0.27 0.37 0.32 -0.11 0.38 -0.12 -0.22 0.06 0.04 0.33 0.11
SPi(k) = [SP
t
i (k), SP
f
i (k)] (1)
where t represents the time domain, f represents the frequency
domain, and
SP ti (k) = [mean(Si(k)), var(Si(k)),max(Si(k)),min(Si(k))]
SP fi (k) = [peak(Si(k)), freq(Si(k)), peak2(Si(k))]
(2)
Therefore the feature vector for the smartphone is
SP (k) = [SPaccerometer(k), SPgyroscope(k)] (3)
Similarly, we have the the feature vector for the sensor
data from the smartwatch, denoted SW (k). Therefore, the
authentication feature vector is
Authenticate(k) = [SP (k), SW (k)] (4)
E. Can Context Detection help?
Since it seems intuitive that sensor measurements of motion
may be different under different contexts, we now consider
the minimum contexts that can improve the accuracy of
user authentication. To be viable, we need very fast, user-
agnostic context detection, since this must now precede user
authentication, and we also want to keep real-time computation
to an acceptable level. Hence, we try using the same feature
vector in Eq. 3 for the smartphone only (no smartwatch)
context detection. During the user enrollment phase, we feed
these feature vectors from all users into the context detection
model to train it. During the testing phase, we use this user-
agnostic context detection model to detect the current user
context.
1) Random Forest for context detection: We experimented
with several machine learning algorithms for context detection,
and chose the Random forest algorithm [41]. This is com-
monly used in data mining. It creates a model that predicts
the value of a target variable based on several input variables.
Initially, we tried using four contexts: (1) The user uses the
smartphone without moving around, e.g., while standing or
sitting; (2) The user uses the smartphone while moving. No
constraints are set for how the user moves; (3) The smartphone
TABLE V
CONFUSION MATRIX OF CONTEXT DETECTION RESULTS USING TWO
SMARTPHONE SENSORS.
Confusion Matrix Stationary Moving
Stationary 99.1% 0.9%
Moving 0.6% 99.4%
is stationary (e.g., on a table) while the user uses it; (4) The
user uses the smartphone on a moving vehicle, e.g., train.
However, we found that these four contexts can not be easily
differentiated: contexts (3) and (4) are easily misclassified as
context (1), since (1), (3) and (4) are all relatively stationary
(e.g., when moving at a stable speed), compared to context
(2). Therefore, we combined contexts (1), (3) and (4) into one
stationary context, and left (2) as the moving context. The
resulting confusion matrix in Table V showed a very high
context detection accuracy of over 99% with these 2 simple
contexts. The context detection time was also very short - less
than 3 milliseconds.
For these context training and testing experiments, we had
users use their smartphones in fixed contexts under controlled
lab conditions. Users were asked to use the smartphone and
the smartwatch freely under each context for 20 minutes. They
were told to stay in the current context until the experiment is
finished. Note that such recording process is only needed for
developing the context detection model and is not required
for normal use in real-world scenarios. We use these data
from the different users to train the context detection model
in a user-agnostic manner. That is, when we perform context
detection for a given user, we use a context detection model
(i.e., classifier) that was trained with other users’ data. This
enables us to detect the context of the current user prior to
authenticating her. For the Random Forest algorithm, we use
10-fold cross-validation to get the results in Table V.
F. User Authentication Algorithms
1) Features: We now ask whether such simple, fast and
user-agnostic contexts (stationary versus moving) can signifi-
cantly improve the accuracy of user authentication? If so, to
what extent? For this, we did different experiments, where the
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TABLE VI
AUTHENTICATION PERFORMANCE WITH DIFFERENT MACHINE LEARNING
ALGORITHMS.
Method FRR FAR Accuracy
KRR 0.9% 2.8% 98.1%
SVM 2.7% 2.5% 97.4%
Linear Regression 12.7% 14.6% 86.3%
Naive Bayes 10.8% 13.9% 87.6%
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Fig. 4. FRR and FAR with different window sizes under two contexts. (a)
and (b) are the FRRs under different contexts. (c) and (d) are the FARs under
different contexts. Both the FRR and FAR become stable when the window
size is larger than 6 seconds.
users could use their smartphones and smartwatches as they
normally do in their daily lives, without any constraints on
the contexts under which they used their devices. Users were
invited to take our smartphone and smartwatch for one to two
weeks, and use them under free-form, real-use conditions.
We evaluate the accuracy of user authentication when only
the smartphone’s sensor features from the accelerometer and
gyroscope were used, and when both the smartphone and
smartwatch’s sensor features were used. The former had
feature vectors with 7 × 2 = 14 elements, while the latter
had feature vectors with 7× 2× 2 = 28 elements.
2) Kernel Ridge Regression algorithm: Here we tried dif-
ferent machine learning algorithms, and found the Kernel
Ridge Regression (KRR) machine learning algorithm to give
the best results. Table VI shows user authentication results for
a sample of state-of-the-art machine learning techniques: KRR,
Support Vector Machines (SVM), linear regression, and naive
Bayes. We see that KRR achieves the best accuracy. SVM
also achieves high accuracy but the computational complexity
is much higher than KRR (shown in Section V-H). Linear
regression and naive Bayes have significantly lower accuracy
compared to KRR and SVM.
Kernel ridge regressions (KRR) have been widely used for
classification analysis [30], [42], [43], [44]. The advantage of
KRR is that the computational complexity is much less than
other machine learning methods, e.g., SVM. The goal of KRR
is to learn a model that assigns the correct label to an unseen
testing sample. This can be thought of as learning a function
f : X → Y which maps each data x to a label y. The optimal
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Fig. 5. Accuracy with different data sizes under the two contexts. We observe
that the best accuracy happens when the data size is around 800. The accuracy
decreases after the training set size is larger than 800 because a large training
data set is likely to cause over-fitting in the machine learning algorithms.
classifier can be obtained analytically according to
w∗ = argmin
w∈Rd
ρ‖w‖2 +
N∑
k=1
(wTxk − yk)
2 (5)
where N is the data size and xM×1k represents the transpose
of Authenticate(k), the authentication feature vector, and M
is the dimension of the authentication feature vector. Let X
denote a M ×N training data matrix X = [x1,x2, · · · ,xN ].
Let y = [y1,y2, · · · ,yN ]. ~φ(xi) denotes the kernel function,
which maps the original data xi into a higher-dimensional (J)
space. In addition, we define Φ = [~φ(x1)~φ(x2) · · · ~φ(xN)]
and K = ΦTΦ. This objective function in Eq. 5 has an
analytic optimal solution [30] where
w∗ = Φ[K + ρIN ]
−1y (6)
By utilizing certain matrix transformation properties, the com-
putational complexity for computing the optimal w∗ in Eq. 6
can be largely reduced from O(N2.373) to O(M2.373), which
we will carefully discuss in Section V-H. This is a huge
reduction since N=800 data points in our experiments, and
M = 28 features in our authentication feature vector.
3) System Parameters: We need to decide on two important
parameters in the system, the window size and the size of the
dataset. We empirically derive the “optimal” values for these
parameters.
Window Size.
The window size is an important system parameter, which
determines the time that our system needs to perform an au-
thentication, i.e., window size directly determines our system’s
authentication frequency.
For each context, we vary the window size from 1 second
to 16 seconds. Given a window size and a detected context,
for each target user, we utilize 10-fold cross-validation for
training and testing. Here, we utilize the false reject rate
(FRR) and false accept rate (FAR) as metrics to evaluate the
authentication accuracy of our system. FRR is the fraction
of the legitimate user’s data that are misclassified as other
users’ data. FAR is the fraction of other users’ data that are
misclassified as the legitimate user’s. For security protection,
a large FAR is more harmful than a large FRR. However, a
large FRR would degrade the usage convenience. Therefore,
we investigate the influence of the window size on FRR and
FAR, in choosing a proper window size.
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TABLE VII
THE FRR,FAR AND ACCURACY UNDER TWO CONTEXTS WITH DIFFERENT
DEVICES.
Context Device FRR FAR Accuracy
w/o context Smartphone 15.4% 17.4% 83.6%
Combination 7.3% 9.3% 91.7%
w/ context Smartphone 5.1% 8.3% 93.3%
Combination 0.9% 2.8% 98.1%
Figure 4 shows that the FRR and FAR for each context
become stable when the window size is greater than 6 seconds.
The smartphone has better (lower) FRR and FAR than the
smartwatch. The combination of the smartphone and smart-
watch has the lowest FRR and FAR, and achieves the best
authentication performance than using each alone.
Data Size.
Another important system parameter is the size of the data
set, which also affects the overall authentication accuracy
because a larger training data set provides the system more
information. According to our observations above, we set
the window size as 6 seconds. We ranged the training set
sizes, from 100 to 1200 and show the experimental results
in Figure 5. We see that as the training set size increases,
the accuracy first increases, approaching a maximum accuracy
point, and then decreases. The maximum accuracy happens
when the data size is around 800. The accuracy decreases after
the training set size is larger than 800 because a large training
data set is likely to cause over-fitting in the machine learning
algorithms so that the constructed training model would in-
troduce more errors than expected. Comparing the three lines
in each figure, we also find that using more devices provides
extra information that improves authentication accuracy.
4) User Authentication Evaluation with KRR: We now
show the overall authentication performance of our system
in Table VII by setting the window size as 6 seconds and the
data size as 800 (from Section V-F3 results).
From Table VII, we have the following interesting observa-
tions: (1) SmarterYou works well with just the smartphone,
even without contexts: by using only the smartphone without
considering any context, our system can achieve authentication
accuracy up to 83.6%. (2) Auxiliary devices are helpful: by
combining sensor data from the smartwatch with the smart-
phone sensor data, the authentication performance increases
significantly over that of the smartphone alone, reaching
91.7% accuracy, with better FRR and FAR. (3) Context
detection is beneficial for authentication: the authentication
accuracy is further improved, when we take the finer-grained
context differences into consideration, reaching 93.3% accu-
racy with the smartphone alone, and 98.1% accuracy with the
combination of smartphone and smartwatch data.
We also found that the overall time for implementing
context detection followed by user authentication is less than
21 milliseconds. This is a fast user authentication testing time,
with excellent authentication accuracy of 98%, making our
system efficient and applicable in real world scenarios.
G. Masquerading attacks
Our third set of experiments was designed to analyze our
system’s performance in defending against some real world
attacks (e.g., masquerading or mimicry attacks). We consider
the worst case situation where we assume the attacker is
able to monitor and record the victim’s behavior. Thus the
attacker can try his best to learn the victim’s behavior. In
these experiments, we asked each subject to be a malicious
adversary whose goal was to mimic the victim user’s behavior
to the best of his/her ability. One user’s data was recorded and
his/her model was built as the legitimate user. The other users
tried to mimic the legitimate user and cheat the system to let
them be authenticated as the victim user. The victim user was
recorded by a VCR. Subjects were asked to watch the video
and mimic the behavior. Both the adversary and the legitimate
user performed the same tasks, and the user’s behavior is
clearly visible to the adversary. Such an attack is repeated
20 times for each legitimate user and his/her ‘adversaries’.
Recall that the goal of an attacker is to get access to
the sensitive information stored in the smartphone, or in the
cloud accessed through the smartphone. As we have shown in
Figure 4 and Table VII, SmarterYou achieves very low FARs
when attackers attempt to use the smartphone with their own
behavioral patterns.
Now, we show that SmarterYou is even secure against the
masquerading attacks where an adversary tries to mimic the
user’s behavior. Here, ‘secure’ means that the attacker cannot
cheat the system via performing these spoofing attacks and the
system should detect these attacks in a short time. To evaluate
this, we design a masquerading attack where the adversary
not only knows the password but also observes and mimics
the user’s behavioral patterns. If the adversary succeeds in
mimicking the user’s behavioral pattern, then SmarterYou will
misidentify the adversary as the legitimate user and he/she can
thus use the victim user’s smartphone.
In order to show the ability of SmarterYou to defend against
these mimicry attacks, we counted the percentage of people
(attackers) who were still using the smartphone without being
de-authenticated by the system as the attack time progresses.
Figure 6 shows the fraction of adversaries that are recognized
as legitimate users by SmarterYou at time t, from which we
can see how quickly SmarterYou can recognize an adversary
and terminate his access to the smartphone. At t = 0, all the
adversaries have access to the smartphone, but within 6s, only
10% of adversaries have access. That is, SmarterYou identified
on average 90% of adversaries as unauthorized users within
6s. By t = 18s, SmarterYou identified all the adversaries.
Therefore, SmarterYou performed well in recognizing the
adversary who is launching the masquerading attack.
These experimental results also match with analysis from
a theoretical point of view. We assume the FAR in each time
window is p, then the chance that the attacker can escape from
detection in n time windows is pn. Based on our experimental
results in Section V-F, our system can achieve 2.8% FAR
in a time window of 6 seconds. Thus, within only three
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Fig. 6. Fraction of adversaries that have access to the legitimate user’s
smartphone at time t.
windows, the probability for the attacker escaping detection
is (2.8%)3 = 0.002%, which is very small. Therefore, our
SmarterYou system shows good performance in defending
against masquerading attacks.
H. Smartphone Overhead
We now evaluate the system overhead of SmarterYou on
smartphones. Specifically, we analyze the computational com-
plexity of our system, CPU and memory overhead, and the
battery consumption it incurs on the smartphone.
1) Computational Complexity: The computational com-
plexity of KRR in Section V-F2 is directly related to the
data size according to Eq. 6. Here, we further show that the
computational complexity can be largely reduced to be directly
related to the feature size. (For readability, we put the detailed
proof in the Appendix).
According to Eq. 6, the classifier is w∗ = Φ[K + ρIN ]
−1y.
Define S = ΦΦT (Φ = [~φ(x1), ~φ(x2), · · · , ~φ(xN)]). By
utilizing the matrix transformation method in [45], the optimal
solution w∗ in Eq. 6 is equivalent to
w∗ = [S + ρIJ ]
−1Φy (7)
The dominant computational complexity for w∗ comes from
taking the inversion of a matrix. Therefore, based on Eq. 6
and Eq. 7, the computational complexity is approximately
min(O(N2.373), O(J2.373)). If we utilize the identity kernel,
the computational complexity can be reduced from O(N2.373)
to O(M2.373) and is independent of the data size. Specifically,
we construct 28-dimensional feature vectors (4 time-domain
features and 3 frequency-domain features for each of two
sensors, for each device).
Thus, our time complexity is reduced from O((800 ×
9/10)2.373) = O(7202.373) to only O(282.373). In our ex-
periments, the average training time is 0.065 seconds and
the average testing time is 18 milliseconds, which shows the
effectiveness of our system applied in real-world scenarios.
2) CPU and Memory Overhead: The testing module of
SmarterYou in a smartphone runs as threads inside the smart-
phone system process. We develop an application to monitor
the average CPU and memory utilization of the phone and
watch while running the SmarterYou app which continuously
requests sensor data at a rate of 50 Hz on a Nexus 5
smartphone and a Moto 360 smartwatch. The CPU utilization
is 5% on average and never exceeds 6%. The CPU utilization
(and hence energy consumption) will scale with the sampling
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Fig. 7. The confidence score of a user with time. After around one week,
the confidence score decreases below the threshold ǫCS = 0.2 for a period
of time. After automatic retraining, it increases back to normal values.
TABLE VIII
THE POWER CONSUMPTION UNDER FOUR DIFFERENT SCENARIOS.
Scenario Power Consumption
(1) Phone locked, SmarterYou off 2.8%
(2) Phone locked, SmarterYou on 4.9%
(3) Phone unlocked, SmarterYou off 5.2%
(4) Phone unlocked, SmarterYou on 7.6%
rate. The memory utilization is 3 MB on average. Thus, we
believe that the overhead of SmarterYou is small enough to
have negligible effect on overall smartphone performance.
3) Battery Consumption: To measure the battery consump-
tion, we consider the following four testing scenarios: (1)
Phone is locked (i.e., not being used) and SmarterYou is off.
(2) Phone is locked and SmarterYou keeps running. (3) Phone
is under use and SmarterYou is off. (4) Phone is under use
and SmarterYou is running. For scenarios (1) and (2), the test
time is 12 hours each. We charge the smartphone battery to
100% and check the battery level after 12 hours. The average
difference of the battery charged level from 100% is reported
in Table VIII.
For scenarios (3) and (4), the phone under use means that
the user keeps using the phone periodically. During the using
time, the user keeps typing notes. The period of using and
non-using is five minutes each, and the test time in total is 60
minutes.
Table VIII shows the result of our battery consumption tests,
in terms of extra battery drain for SmarterYou. We find that in
scenarios (1) and (2), the SmarterYou-on mode consumes 2.1%
more battery power than the SmarterYou-off mode. We believe
the extra cost in battery consumption caused by SmaterYou
will not affect user experience in daily use. For scenarios (3)
and (4), SmarterYou consumes 2.4% more battery power in
one hour, which is also an acceptable cost for daily usage.
I. Retraining Authentication Models
The behavioral drift of the legitimate user must be con-
sidered. The user may change his/her behavioral pattern over
weeks or months, which may cause more false alarms in
implicit authentication. SmarterYou, therefore, will retrain the
authentication models automatically and continuously based
on the previous authentication performance. Here, we define
the confidence score (CS) as CS(k) = xTkw
∗ for the k-th
authentication feature vector xTk as the distance between x
T
k
and the corresponding authentication classifier w∗.
11
As the authentication classifier w∗ represents the clas-
sification boundary to distinguish the legitimate user and
the adversaries, a lower confidence score (smaller distance
between xTk and w
∗) represents a less confident authentication
result (shown conceptually in the left figure of Figure 7). This
suggests a change of user’s behavioral pattern where retraining
should be taken. For an authenticated user, we suggest that if
the confidence score is lower than a certain threshold ǫCS
for a period of time T , the system automatically retrains the
authentication models.
In Figure 7 (right figure), we show the confidence score
of the time-series authentication feature vectors for a user.
We can see that the confidence score decreases slowly in
the first week. At the end of the first week, the confidence
score experiences a period of low values (lower than our
threshold ǫCS = 0.2 for a period), indicating that the user’s
behavior changes to some extent during this week. Therefore,
it would be helpful if the system can automatically retrain the
authentication models. Note that there are some earlier points
lower than the threshold (0.2), but they do not occur for a long
enough period to trigger the retraining. Also, it is hard for the
attacker to trigger the retraining because the probability that
the attacker continuously passes the authentication for a long
period of time is low as described in Section V-G.
As our system recognizes user’s behavior drift by checking
the confidence score, it would then go back to the training
module again and upload the legitimate user’s authentication
feature vectors to the training module until the new behavior
(authentication model) is learned. Advanced approaches in
machine unlearning [46] can be explored to update the au-
thentication models asymptotically faster than retraining from
scratch. After retraining the user’s authentication models, we
can see that the confidence score increases to normal values
from Day 8.
As discussed earlier, an attacker who has taken over a
legitimate user’s smartphone must not be allowed to retrain the
authentication model. Fortunately, the attacker can not trigger
the retraining since the confidence score should be positive and
last for a period of time. However, the attacker is likely to have
negative confidence scores, which cannot last for sufficient
time to trigger retraining, since he will be detected in less
than 18 seconds by SmarterYou, according to Figure 6.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have proposed a new re-authentication system,
SmarterYou, to improve the security of a smartphone, and
of secret and sensitive data and code in the smartphone or
in the cloud accessible through a smartphone. SmarterYou
is an authentication system using multiple sensors built into
a user’s smartphone, supplemented by auxiliary information
from a wearable device, e.g., smartwatch, with the same
owner as the smartphone. Our system keeps monitoring the
users’ sensor data and continuously authenticates without any
human cooperation. We first collect context features from
the sensors’ data in the smartphone (and the smartwatch if
present) to detect the context of the current user. Based on the
detected context and the authentication features in both the
time and frequency domains, our system implements finer-
grained authentication efficiently and stealthily.
We systematically evaluate design alternatives for each
design parameter of such a sensor-based implicit authenti-
cation system. Based on our design choices, our evaluations
demonstrate the advantage of combining the smartphone and
the smartwatch and the enhancement in authentication accu-
racy with context detection and time-frequency information.
SmarterYou can achieve authentication accuracy up to 98.1%
(FRR 0.9% and FAR 2.8%) with negligible system overhead
and less than 2.4% additional battery consumption. We believe
this is the highest accuracy and lowest FAR reported by any
sensor-based authentication method to date. We hope that the
SmarterYou system and design techniques can help advance
the field in implicit user authentication and re-authentication,
for deployment in real-world scenarios.
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VII. APPENDIX
A. Proof of Equivalence between Eq. 6 and Eq. 7
Eq. 6 is w∗ = Φ[K + ρIN ]
−1y, and Eq. 7 is w∗ = [S + ρIJ ]
−1Φy.
In order to prove that they are equivalent, we first prove PBT (BPBT +
ρR)−1 = (ρP−1 +BTR−1B)−1BTR−1 as follows:
ρBT +BTR−1BPBT = BTR−1BPBT + ρBT
⇔ (ρP−1 +BTR−1B)PBT = BTR−1(BPBT + ρR)
⇔ PBT (BPBT + ρR)−1 = (ρP−1 +BTR−1B)−1BTR−1
(8)
Then we let P = IJ , B = Φ
T and R = IN in Eq. 8, we observe the
left hand side of Eq. 8 is Eq. 6 and the right hand side of Eq. 8 is Eq. 7.
Thus, we prove the equivalence between Eq. 6 and Eq. 7.
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